The Asian Outlook.com

‘Enduring Relations?’

by: Husain Haqqani

As the US-led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ gets under way, it is becoming increasingly clear that Pakistan needs to temper its excitement over being a frontline state in the war against terrorism. President General Pervez Musharraf has said repeatedly that his decision to support the United States was motivated by concerns about Pakistan’s national survival. If Pakistan had not been a partner of the US, it could have ended up being one of its targets. In that sense, General Musharraf exercised prudence by backing away from being a patron of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. But it would be a mistake on the part of Pakistani decision makers to start looking upon our involvement in ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ as the beginning of an enduring relationship with the United States on Pakistan’s terms.The United States needs crucial intelligence and logistics support from Pakistan. In return Pakistan can expect economic assistance and a revival of close ties with Washington, a process that has already begun. But the US is unlikely to fulfill Pakistan’s expectations of support against Indian control of Jammu and Kashmir. The fact that the US Congress has waived sanctions against Pakistan for an initial period of two years demonstrates that Islamabad’s romantic notion of a permanent alliance with the United States is not necessarily shared in Washington. There are no permanent friends and enemies in international relations, and therefore both countries should base their ties on shared interests.

Pakistan should approach its re-engagement with the international community with minimal illusions. Economic assistance will certainly trickle in but it will be unrealistic to expect that all our debtors will write
off our debt. The Japanese have already indicated that they remain reluctant to write off Pakistan’s debt despite their desire to support General Musharraf. Britain and the United States have come forward with economic packages, which fall far short of wiping out Pakistan’s $36 billion outstanding debt. Being a frontline state in a war carries its own price in terms of lost productivity, export orders and investment. Aid flows are not a substitute for rebuilding the country’s economy though the assistance currently being
offered by Pakistan’s revived allies will help it avert economic disaster.

Egypt’s debt write-off, which is often cited as the model for a Pakistani political and economic turnaround, followed a more fundamental switch in Egypt’s regional policy. Egypt recognized Israel and became a US partner in a long-term regional settlement. Egypt has rebuilt its economy in the years since the signing of the Camp David Accords and its political pre-eminence in the Arab world is based on factors other than military power. Pakistan has, thus far, not had the time since September 11 to decide whether it can make a lasting peace with India, under US sponsorship. India has also shown no signs of wanting such a deal. Thus, the United States, its western allies and Japan will probably be content with bolstering Pakistan’s position in the short-term, while waiting for a long-term scenario to evolve. Of
course, this time there is no likelihood of the international powers simply walking away from Afghanistan and Pakistan, as they did after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon have made the folly of such total disengagement clear to policy makers worldwide.
But a commitment to remain engaged should not be misinterpreted in Pakistan as a commitment to resolve regional issues in our favour.

The visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to South Asia served as a reminder to Pakistan against unrealistic expectations. According to the Washington Post, Powell reassured top Indian officials that “the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism will target not only those behind the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington but also forces involved in violence in the disputed territory of Kashmir. Powell's statement that the United States stands ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with New Delhi in the battle against terrorism was part of a broader effort to keep India from taking matters into its own hands and further escalating tension with Pakistan, which it accuses of sponsoring Muslim separatist guerrillas in Kashmir”.

The United States has an interest in close ties with India that is not limited to the duration of the present military operation in Afghanistan or even the war against terror. Perhaps it is time also for Pakistan to start evaluating the extent to which the United States can, and will, support Islamabad in its own strategic objectives in South Asia. In any case, both Pakistan and India must go beyond the old paradigm that the United States can be a friend of only one of them at any given time.

The decision to actively support US efforts in rooting out terrorism and punishing terrorists such as bin Laden carries many risks for General Musharraf. While the people of Pakistan they share the world’s indignation over the latest terrorist attacks, they do not want US retaliation to hurt fellow Muslim civilians
in Afghanistan or elsewhere. After the end of the cold war, the United States has invested little in winning the hearts and minds of people in the Muslim world. As a result, the poor and the dispossessed in under-developed Muslim countries do not always understand the compulsions of US foreign policy. It is easy for the enemies of the United States to whip up anti-American sentiment, especially when innocent civilians become casualties in US attacks. Pakistan is currently facing anti-US demonstrations, which may not amount to much for the moment. But these could affect the stability of General Musharraf’s military regime if the war goes on for too long or if the US appears to be going beyond its stated target --- the dismantling of alleged terrorist bases. By joining the US-led coalition against terrorism, General Musharraf is trying to end Pakistan’s international isolation. He should also make an effort, at this critical juncture, to diminish the domestic political isolation of his regime. A government depending only upon the military for support cannot effectively wage war against militant ideologies, which have spawned the kind of terrorism that the international community is now mobilizing to eliminate. General Musharraf’s government should avoid over-stating what Pakistan might gain from supporting the United States at this critical juncture. The illusion that this alliance will lead to an economic bonanza for Pakistan or to US support for the Kashmiri people against India should be set aside. Pakistan’s interest should no longer be defined in terms of permanent conflict with India or a mythical enduring relationship with the United States. (ends)





		‘Enduring Relations?’ by: Husain Haqqani As the US-led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ gets under way, it is becoming increasingly clear that Pakistan needs to temper its excitement over being a frontline state in the war against terrorism. President General Pervez Musharraf has said repeatedly that his decision to support the United States was motivated by concerns about Pakistan’s national survival. If Pakistan had not been a partner of the US, it could have ended up being one of its targets. In that sense, General Musharraf exercised prudence by backing away from being a patron of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. But it would be a mistake on the part of Pakistani decision makers to start looking upon our involvement in ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ as the beginning of an enduring relationship with the United States on Pakistan’s terms.The United States needs crucial intelligence and logistics support from Pakistan. In return Pakistan can expect economic assistance and a revival of close ties with Washington, a process that has already begun. But the US is unlikely to fulfill Pakistan’s expectations of support against Indian control of Jammu and Kashmir. The fact that the US Congress has waived sanctions against Pakistan for an initial period of two years demonstrates that Islamabad’s romantic notion of a permanent alliance with the United States is not necessarily shared in Washington. There are no permanent friends and enemies in international relations, and therefore both countries should base their ties on shared interests. Pakistan should approach its re-engagement with the international community with minimal illusions. Economic assistance will certainly trickle in but it will be unrealistic to expect that all our debtors will write off our debt. The Japanese have already indicated that they remain reluctant to write off Pakistan’s debt despite their desire to support General Musharraf. Britain and the United States have come forward with economic packages, which fall far short of wiping out Pakistan’s $36 billion outstanding debt. Being a frontline state in a war carries its own price in terms of lost productivity, export orders and investment. Aid flows are not a substitute for rebuilding the country’s economy though the assistance currently being offered by Pakistan’s revived allies will help it avert economic disaster. Egypt’s debt write-off, which is often cited as the model for a Pakistani political and economic turnaround, followed a more fundamental switch in Egypt’s regional policy. Egypt recognized Israel and became a US partner in a long-term regional settlement. Egypt has rebuilt its economy in the years since the signing of the Camp David Accords and its political pre-eminence in the Arab world is based on factors other than military power. Pakistan has, thus far, not had the time since September 11 to decide whether it can make a lasting peace with India, under US sponsorship. India has also shown no signs of wanting such a deal. Thus, the United States, its western allies and Japan will probably be content with bolstering Pakistan’s position in the short-term, while waiting for a long-term scenario to evolve. Of course, this time there is no likelihood of the international powers simply walking away from Afghanistan and Pakistan, as they did after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon have made the folly of such total disengagement clear to policy makers worldwide. But a commitment to remain engaged should not be misinterpreted in Pakistan as a commitment to resolve regional issues in our favour. The visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to South Asia served as a reminder to Pakistan against unrealistic expectations. According to the Washington Post, Powell reassured top Indian officials that “the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism will target not only those behind the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington but also forces involved in violence in the disputed territory of Kashmir. Powell's statement that the United States stands ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with New Delhi in the battle against terrorism was part of a broader effort to keep India from taking matters into its own hands and further escalating tension with Pakistan, which it accuses of sponsoring Muslim separatist guerrillas in Kashmir”. The United States has an interest in close ties with India that is not limited to the duration of the present military operation in Afghanistan or even the war against terror. Perhaps it is time also for Pakistan to start evaluating the extent to which the United States can, and will, support Islamabad in its own strategic objectives in South Asia. In any case, both Pakistan and India must go beyond the old paradigm that the United States can be a friend of only one of them at any given time. The decision to actively support US efforts in rooting out terrorism and punishing terrorists such as bin Laden carries many risks for General Musharraf. While the people of Pakistan they share the world’s indignation over the latest terrorist attacks, they do not want US retaliation to hurt fellow Muslim civilians in Afghanistan or elsewhere. After the end of the cold war, the United States has invested little in winning the hearts and minds of people in the Muslim world. As a result, the poor and the dispossessed in under-developed Muslim countries do not always understand the compulsions of US foreign policy. It is easy for the enemies of the United States to whip up anti-American sentiment, especially when innocent civilians become casualties in US attacks. Pakistan is currently facing anti-US demonstrations, which may not amount to much for the moment. But these could affect the stability of General Musharraf’s military regime if the war goes on for too long or if the US appears to be going beyond its stated target --- the dismantling of alleged terrorist bases. By joining the US-led coalition against terrorism, General Musharraf is trying to end Pakistan’s international isolation. He should also make an effort, at this critical juncture, to diminish the domestic political isolation of his regime. A government depending only upon the military for support cannot effectively wage war against militant ideologies, which have spawned the kind of terrorism that the international community is now mobilizing to eliminate. General Musharraf’s government should avoid over-stating what Pakistan might gain from supporting the United States at this critical juncture. The illusion that this alliance will lead to an economic bonanza for Pakistan or to US support for the Kashmiri people against India should be set aside. Pakistan’s interest should no longer be defined in terms of permanent conflict with India or a mythical enduring relationship with the United States. (ends)