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Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
(PINR) -- Recent comments made by U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz further articulate the Bush administration's less prominent reasons for removing from power the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. Wolfowitz told the U.S. magazine Vanity Fair that the threat and/or existence of weapons of mass destruction was not the only reason for the U.S.-led attack, and that what was presented and believed by many to be the primary justification for the war -- weapons of mass destruction -- was merely a "bureaucratic reason" that "everyone could agree on." The Deputy Secretary's words come at an already contentious time, fueled by the continued failure of the United States government to find Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction.
Instead, Wolfowitz, commonly seen as one of
the main architects of current Bush administration policy, explained that a
"huge" reason for the war was the need to remove U.S. troops from Saudi
Arabia. Wolfowitz said, "Just lifting that burden from the Saudis is itself
going to open the door to a more peaceful Middle East." After the Gulf War
in 1991, the Bush administration kept a large contingent of U.S. troops in
Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to patrol the two "no fly zones," established by
the United States in southern and northern Iraq. The "no fly zones" provided
Washington with the permanent opportunity to bomb targets of choice in Iraq,
in addition to keeping the Saddam Hussein regime weak in case a future
invasion became necessary. However, U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia helped lead
to what U.S. intelligence agencies term as "blowback" -- when U.S. policies
cause unexpected damage to U.S. interests.
The September 11 attacks were the unanticipated side-effects of U.S.
policies abroad -- supporting the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the
Soviet Union, stationing U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and other
Muslim-majority countries, providing large amounts of military and financial
aid to the state of Israel, aiding Middle Eastern despots who suppress
domestic dissent, and manipulating political developments in Middle Eastern
states, either through outright military intervention or covertly. Due to
these policies, the citizens of Muslim-majority countries found much of
their societal anguish caused by the policies emanating from the White
House. This anguish helped give rise to militant Islamic groups that found
the U.S. to be the source of their discontent and hatred. When this hatred
culminated in the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration was forced
to reassess U.S. foreign policy objectives. The Bush administration's
reaction to the attacks was to increase U.S. influence around the world,
especially in countries with strong Islamic sympathies.
By removing Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist infrastructure, the Bush administration was able to quickly remove a government that -- to their advantage -- posed little military threat to the U.S. invading forces and also was led by a fascist dictator that much of the world despised; in return, the United States was afforded the option of using Iraq as a new staging ground for the war on militant Islam. Now that Saddam Hussein has been removed, the Bush administration has been able to withdraw troops from Saudi Arabia, thus giving the United States more diplomatic leverage with the Saudi leadership. Through this leverage, Washington can now press Riyadh to brutally crack down on Islamic militant groups and their sympathizers within Saudi society.
Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers involved in the September 11 attacks were Saudi nationals, a fact that more than hints at the vitriolic attitude that much of Saudi society has toward U.S. policies in the Middle East. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has supported Palestinian militant groups in their fight against the Israelis, the latter a consistent U.S. ally that currently has unusual clout in the U.S. government due to the composition of the Bush administration.
Saudi Arabia also came under attack last summer by an analyst with the Rand Corporation who was invited by Richard Perle to address the Pentagon Defense Advisory Board. Laurent Murawiec told the group that Saudi Arabia is a country whose contributions and support are vital to the existence of terrorism. Murawiec also said, "There is an 'Arabia,' but it needs not be 'Saudi.'" (See "Uncertainty in Saudi Arabia")
Combined with the statements by Wolfowitz and other members of the Bush administration, it is clear that Washington has a significant interest in increasing their influence in the Middle East in an attempt to eliminate groups that are willing to use violence to damage U.S. interests at home and abroad. It is no longer seen as a region where developments can take their time; the U.S. plans on preemptively dealing with various issues immediately.
In addition to Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran have been two of a few chosen countries to receive serious scrutiny by the Bush administration. The governments of both countries have been critical of U.S. foreign policy, much to the approval of their citizenry. But now with U.S. military forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. finds itself able to easily strike both countries. Because of this, Washington was able to use the invasion of Iraq to increase its influence over both Syria and Iran, in addition to other Middle Eastern states.
Therefore, as long as the U.S. is able to retain control of Iraq, and mend ties with former allies, Washington will find itself in a better position to politically and physically eliminate militant Islamic groups or governments that threaten U.S. interests. The main vulnerability of this strategy is that it will increase accessibility to U.S. targets for these groups to attack. The U.S. could also possibly be helping their enemies recruit new members willing to attack the United States and its interests due to Washington's increased presence in the affairs of Middle Eastern societies. Already, anti-American attitudes throughout the world, and especially in the Middle East, have increased since the election of the Bush administration -- and even more so since the invasion of Iraq. This vulnerability could work to quickly intensify the very feelings that the U.S. is trying to destroy.
Erich Marquardt drafted this report.
Published with permission from www.yt.org