Confidence-building in Kashmir —Brian Cloughley

Recent developments give me cause for greater optimism about moving forward than I have had in the quarter century spent as an observer of the India-Pakistan scene
 

When this article appears I shall be at the Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy in the UK giving presentations on practical confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Kashmir. I thought it might be of interest to reproduce my introduction (edited a bit), and then, after the emails arrive, I might elaborate and also describe the proceedings at the Centre, as there are two separate seminars, one for Indian and one for Pakistani participants, with a dozen or so neutrals like myself attending both. So here is the preamble to my detailed proposals about CBMs.

Last November and December I spent four weeks in Pakistan and India, and much of that time was given to research concerning practical confidence-building measures in Kashmir. The region was the hot topic at the time, because the SAARC meeting was about to be held, and discussion was fast and sometimes furious about what Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf would or would not do.

The pessimists feared there would be nothing more than a formal greeting exchanged and that if Pakistan tried to move towards discussions in the margins there would be flat refusal by India. The optimists considered it possible that there would be formal discussions, and even that the matter of Kashmir might be tackled.

The outcome lay in the middle, but verging towards the optimists’ predictions. There was a meeting, and the communiqué thereafter was carefully phrased but did actually mention Kashmir in that “The two leaders are confident that the resumption of composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir...”

Indeed it was similar to the Simla Accord of 1972, and the Lahore Declaration of 1999, for the first of these stated “Both Governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace, including the question[s] of... a final settlement of Kashmir...”

And at Lahore it was agreed that: “...an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interests of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose.”

It is notable that the Lahore Declaration emphasised ‘mutually-agreed confidence-building measures’, although this was confined to ‘existing’ CBMs, and at the January meeting it was ‘hoped’ that ‘the positive trends set by the CBMs would be consolidated’. While that is an important expression of probable intention, there has as yet been nothing definitive decided about CBMs, and this is understandable, because there is a lot of detail involved.

Major gestures, such as restoration of rail and air links, are far from inconsequential, and are indeed essential if relations between the countries are to improve. But creation of practical lower-level CBMs is a complex matter, and the devil, as always, lies in the detail.

During my visit I spoke about confidence-building with many people, including President Musharraf, with whom I had a most interesting chat. Other interlocutors included serving and retired senior officers in Pakistan, and many individuals in the public and private sectors.

In Delhi I met with senior officials of the Ministry of External Affairs and visited the valley of Kashmir where I had discussions with the Corps commander, one of his divisional commanders and two brigade commanders in the Uri Sector of the LoC. They took me to an observation post from which it was possible to see two villages on the Indian side that were subjected to bombardment during cross-Line shelling and from which, of course, return fire could be directed.

Please note that I make no attempt to apportion blame concerning exchanges of fire along the Line. This way lies disaster. In fact I got a wry laugh out of President Musharraf when I said that such discussion was rather like an argument in an officers’ mess about anything at all: you have a flat statement followed by a flat contradiction, followed by personal abuse.

And Prime Minister Vajpayee is of the same opinion, in that he stated on Pakistan television that “The problem is that there have been no sustained talks. Pakistan has been repeating its stance [over Kashmir] and we have been doing the same, and the world has been saying that we should resolve it. We need time to move forward; there should be a continued dialogue”.

So the time for finger-pointing is over – which does not mean to say that the energetic media of both countries will not point fingers and even shake fists when they imagine they have cause to do so. The same goes for various political and quasi-political elements in India and Pakistan, some of them on the fringes of legality and some beyond the pale, but including others to which many reasonable people pay attention.

This is one of the reasons that discussions between Islamabad and New Delhi have to be discreet to the point of being boring, lest there be an opportunity for opponents of dialogue stop the wheels of progress. This is extremely important when considering practical CBMs along the Line of Control, because it is only too easy to pick holes in proposals that are dependent on intricate negotiation.

The matter of CBMs themselves must be transparent. Indeed it is their very openness that encourages confidence and makes them effective, not only in practical terms of avoiding bloodshed but in creation of an atmosphere of trust. And it is trust that has been conspicuously lacking for so many decades.

For over half a century, the story of Kashmir has been overhung by seemingly irreconcilable differences and grave misunderstanding, and stained by bloodshed. The dispute will not go away of its own accord, and its continued existence poses a barrier to reconciliation and a grave danger to peace in the Subcontinent. But recent developments give me cause for greater optimism about moving forward than I have had in the quarter century spent as an observer of the India-Pakistan scene.

There could be no better approach than to put in place practical CBMs in Kashmir that are designed to build trust and confidence and to reduce tension between the countries. My suggestions, which I’ll describe next week, by no means exhaust the number of possible CBMs, but, given goodwill on both sides, they are practical and could be realised in the near future.

Brian Cloughley is a former military officer who writes on international affairs. His website is www.briancloughley.com

Daily Times, Wednesday, 25 February 2004,